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Begin at 00:00

JH:

Hello. My name is Jacob Hutchins and today I will be interviewing Mel Gurtov. We’ll go
ahead and jump right in. First things first, Mel, I was wondering if you could introduce
yourself and your credentials, and then we will jump into questions about the interview
project.
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MG:

I’m Professor Mel Gurtov. I was a Portland State University faculty member from the
end of 1986 until retirement in 2008, in political science and international studies. My
specialties are China and U.S. foreign policy.

JH:

First question. I was wondering if you could speak about what brought you to PSU
initially?

MG:

I was teaching at the University of California Riverside and was looking forward to being
in Oregon somewhere, because I had already purchased some farmland that I thought
would be very nice for retirement, which it has turned out to be. Then the object was
how could I get close to this land, which is actually closer to Eugene than it is to Portland
by about 2 hours. The opportunity came up in international studies to be director in
1986, and so I went up and was interviewed. And, well, obviously I got the job.

JH:

Could you talk a bit about your journey, your academic career in political science
specifically? What brought or interested you in pursuing political science?

MG:

When I was in college at Columbia University, I was actually an American history major,
and for whatever reason I was always fascinated by the history of U.S. relations with
East Asia and wrote a number of papers as an undergraduate on the Korean War, then
the war in Vietnam before U.S. involvement. That led me to change career thoughts
from law school to going on in international relations. I stayed at Columbia, got my
master’s in international affairs along with what’s called a certificate in East Asian
studies, and began my study of Chinese, which I then continued in a year abroad in
Taiwan. Of course, that was a time when U.S.-China relations had not yet been
normalized. While still not having a Ph.D., I was hired by Rand Corporation, which you
may know is a major think tank in Santa Monica, California, because of my work on
Vietnam.

There were not too many Vietnam specialists in those days, even though we were
fighting a terrible war at the time. My very first book was coming out, published by
Columbia University Press, on the early years of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. I was one
of those few so-called experts. I’m not sure how expert I really was, but the fact that I
had written a book said something, so I was hired by Rand. That’s how I got to
California, and I continued at Rand for five years, became involved in the Pentagon
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Papers Project, which is a whole other episode in my life. After five years, I started my
teaching career at the University of California.

JH:

Could you speak a bit to how this background shaped your initial involvement in the
development of Peace Studies at PSU, or perhaps what bridged these careers into
bringing you into your involvement with Peace Studies at PSU?

MG:

I think that’s a very good question in my case, and the brief answer is that at one time,
while I was still a graduate student, I was actually in favor of the Vietnam War, and at
that time at Columbia there were rival student groups opposed to and in favor of the
war. I was on the wrong side. [laughing] As I matured, or so I think, and began my
teaching career and had a chance to more deeply explore the roots of U.S. involvement,
and then even more so when I got to Rand where I was working under government
contract, but had a chance to go to Washington because of the Pentagon Papers Project
and read some of the classified materials on U.S. involvement in Vietnam. All of those
things combined to move me politically to the side of being against the war. As Patricia
[Schechter] may know—I can’t imagine you do—but I actually was one of the very few
authors of the Pentagon Papers that supported Dan Ellsberg at his trial in Los Angeles
during those days in the early 1970s. But anyway, the more I was exposed to the history
of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the more I came to embrace Peace Studies. In general,
my scholarship from that time on was really motivated, and remains so to this day,
focused on what I like to call “human interest analysis,” which really is Peace Studies by
another name.

JH:

How did you come to be directly involved with the rest of the people that built the
program?

MG:

In the course of being director of International Studies, which took up the first five years
of my tenure at Portland State, I got to meet any number of people, including most
especially, I suppose, Rob Gould. Rob and I, and others who naturally came together
because of our interest in non-violence and other Peace Studies values, began to try to
formulate a program at Portland State that might address those kinds of matters. I don’t
remember the exact sequence of events that led us to the stage of saying “Yes, let’s
actually try to create a curriculum,” but we were all of a similar mind and with similar
values about the need for having Peace Studies within a liberal arts curriculum. At some
point it evolved to thinking really seriously about what it would take.
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JH:

We’ve spoken with a number of people about Peace Studies and their role in
administering the program. You seem to occupy a slightly different place than a number
of the other narrators we’ve spoken with in the nature of the courses you taught. I was
wondering if you could speak a bit about your role in the academic growth of Peace
Studies and the development of the classes you taught.

MG:

The main thing I contributed was a graduate-level class on international peace keeping,
which was a wonderful experience over a number of years because it brought in people
from both the political science and peace and conflict resolution areas. We got a nice
mix of students, usually about a dozen, sometimes even a little bit more, and for me it
was a good experience; it was a growing experience because I had not taught that kind
of a course before. I needed to acquaint myself with more of the literature than I was
aware of on international conflict resolution. There is by now a pretty substantial
literature in both theory and practice of conflict resolution at the international level.
That’s the niche that I chose for myself, and I’m very glad I did because it not only was a
pleasure to get into that literature and the case studies that went along with it, but also,
it informed one of my most recent books which is called Engaging Adversaries, which
drew a good deal of inspiration from that course.

JH:

Speaking of engaging adversaries, one thing we wanted to ask was that the Peace
Studies program was established in or around a backdrop of the Gulf War. I was
wondering if you could speak to how establishing the program against that backdrop
affected or shaped the development of the ideas that drove it forward.

MG:

That’s probably true. Students and faculty were pretty engaged in that war. There were
plenty of protests. I took part in quite a number of them along with my colleagues and
students. Of course, the war had its supporters as well as folks like myself on the other
side, very critical. I don’t know that it spurred any huge increase in Peace Studies per se.
You know, it’s one thing to go out and protest, it’s another to actually sign up for a
course or enter a degree program. So I don’t know, and maybe I’m wrong about this,
but I don’t recall at least that the war led to some big jump in enrollment. It probably
should have, but certainly the backdrop was there, and for those of us that were
committed to Peace Studies, and I include students, it made what we were doing all the
more urgent.

JH:

I see. One thing that we’ve spoken about, and this is slightly off the cuff, is theories of
power. Theories of power relationships. With your academic background and your
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involvement with the development of the program, I was wondering if you’d be willing
to speak a bit about how Peace Studies as a program can address different theories of
power, if that question makes sense.

MG:

It makes sense, but I’m not sure I have a sensible answer off the cuff. You know, Rob
Gould, among others, were addressing that kind of question in their courses. I don’t
know how, frankly, how they treated the issue of power relations in their course. Of
course, they were dealing with power relations in many different respects. I assume
everything from landlord and renter, to factory worker and boss. I don’t know if they
got into power relations at a more governmental level, and probably not at an
intergovernmental or international level, which is where to some degree I would have
touched base with that issue. But I’d really have to do a lot more searching before I
could really give a meaningful answer to that question.

JH:

That’s understandable.

MG:

It is a good question. But probably Rob and others are much better equipped to get at it
since they taught it.

JH:

Fair enough. Since I have you here, I was wondering if you could speak a bit about your
thoughts on the future of Peace Studies. Obviously the world right now is in a
situation—not simply with the global pandemic but with a variety of complex
geopolitical factors, there’s wars all over the place—and I was wondering if you could
speak a bit about your thoughts on the future of Peace Studies and the value it has
going forward.

MG:

You know, being out of academia for a while now, though I’m continuing to write and
do research and all that stuff, but when it comes to curricular matters I don’t really have
much of a handle on the future of Peace Studies even at Portland State, let alone
anywhere else. Logically, Peace Studies should have an ever larger role, you know, just
given the way the world is, and I think more of a role than conflict studies which is, after
all, political science, or at least international politics, typically devotes itself to. In
political science, one of my criticisms has always been that it stops at the edge of talking
about conflict resolution. Political scientists can be very good about assessing the
background and evolution of a conflict, but they have usually very little say about, and
very little training in, conflict resolution. That’s where I found a niche for myself, but I
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don’t know that among specialists there has been any great growth in this particular
little industry. The curriculum on Peace Studies should be expanding, the number of
people seriously devoted to peaceful resolution of conflict should be expanding, the
kinds of conflicts that are occurring that need attention, for example in a pandemic, are
constantly expanding and in ways that we wouldn’t have predicted even 5 years ago.
But I’m not too optimistic that that’s where things are moving in the intellectual world.

Just on that subject, although it’s not exactly Peace Studies: someone made me aware
just yesterday of a new book called Human Kind, and apparently it’s a very optimistic
but very learned appraisal of where we are, and I say optimistic because contrary to so
much of what is written today, the author, with considerable data which I haven’t
looked at yet but will, to support it concludes that really humankind is not such a bad
breed after all. For all the instances of violence, which are so easy to point out, domestic
and international, evidently he finds that there is a great deal more altruism, human
kindness, for example in the pandemic that were facing now, and all the rest, than we
usually acknowledge or teach about or try to learn more about. God knows we need
more optimism today, although it has to be realistic optimism; but it just goes to show
that it’s so rare to find something like that, a serious thinker on the subject of peaceful
behavior, let’s say. So it just shows where we’re at intellectually. I think we’re a pretty
backwards species, [laughing] and I was saying in introducing the book to some other
friends that I suppose we’re ripe to be taken over by some more civilized alien culture,
except they would probably look at us and decide we’re not well enough evolved.
[laughing] I’d like to be more optimistic.

JH:

Thank you, Mel. I really appreciate you taking the time to speak with us. What I’d like to
do know is open up the floor. If anyone else in my class has any questions, if Patricia has
any questions, I’d like to give them a chance to ask you.

LADY J: I’m Lady J. I am enthusiastic about conflict transformation, Peace Studies, all the
language that is used to describe this cloud of creating world peace, basically. In
specific, I’m a grad student at Walden University in Communications. I graduated from
PSU last June with a social science degree and a concentration in conflict resolution. I
am excited to talk to you. This has been interesting to learn about the way that you
were able to shift your personal politics. You mentioned that throughout your work with
the Pentagon Papers, it shifted how you thought. I just want to know more about what
that looked like. Would it have happened if you didn’t have access to classified
information? What were the roots of that ideological shift?
21:20
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MG:

Very interesting question. You know, people are always asked, and I’m often asked,
about how I went from being a pro-war enthusiast to being very vigorously anti-war, not
only on that war but on all other wars that have occurred since then. I think it’s the
experiential thing. When I got to Rand, to start my first professional job, even before the
Pentagon Papers unexpectedly came up—because it was a secret project and I had no
hint of it when I was hired—but I was hired primarily to work on the Vietnam War even
though my fundamental training is on China. I happened to meet, at Rand, a small
number of people who were also against the war. People who I regarded as
intellectually very solid and credible. And I became friends with them, and I think that
was very important in helping me to shift at that very personal level and be open to a
critical look at the war.

Then, even before the Pentagon Papers, my first job at Rand was to analyze interviews,
which are now available publicly but were classified at the time, interviews of captured
soldiers from “the enemy side,” the Vietnamese Communist side. These presented a
very human picture of why people joined the other side, a picture that was totally
absent from our mass media and certainly was absent from the minds of people making
war decisions in Washington. That too struck a chord, and as I read the enormous
number of interviews that were available, my analysis, because that was my job to
interpret these analyses and interviews, and my analyses were influenced in a very
critical way about the war.

Then came the Pentagon Papers, the invitation to become part of that top-secret
project, and that exposed me to even more information. You know, the interesting
about it is that sort of final piece in my intellectual puzzle came about in the confines of
the Pentagon, because that’s where I did my work. In fact, it was in the office suite of
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. You would think that in the bowels of the
Pentagon, the belly of the beast, that I would be influenced in precisely the opposite
direction, but not at all. That only added to my view that this was morally and legally,
and in every other way, an unjustified war. That’s the fuller explanation.

LIZA SCHADE:
I don’t know if this is too personal for you or not: what was that transition from pro-war
to anti-war like for you? I know, in my views, I grew up very Republican conservative
and I have gone completely the opposite over the last ten years or so, and it’s been a
conflicting thing for me. I’m glad I’m at this side of it. But that said, how was that
transition like for you? Was it something easy?
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MG:

It was gradual in the way that I describe it, but it was pretty easy. Of course, to use that
word can be very misleading. It wasn’t just “Oh, today I’ll wake up and be anti-war,” or
something. I think it probably played into my background growing up in New York in a
fairly liberal environment anyway. You know, learning from parents and others certain
good values, positive human values, or what you might call “humane” values. They were
all there, and I think that war, at that time, touched a nerve and led me to think more
deeply than I had as a grad student. And so it went. Yes, along the way there was
pushback, of course, from a variety of people.

LS:

Did you lose friends?

MG:

Not really from friends, but certainly at Rand Corporation, which after all, at that time,
was heavily dependent on Department of Defense and other government contracts. So
you can imagine that there were lots of people there that were hostile to those of us—
and we were a very distinct minority—who were against the war and were therefore
very happy when people like me left to go into academia. [laughing] One less problem
to deal with. But nevertheless, I felt pretty firm in my convictions, and fortunately—and
this is always very important—I had support. There was a kind of support group. I
wasn’t alone hanging out there on a limb. That’s why my colleague at the time, Dan
Ellsberg, who’s still a friend of mine, when he and a few others came up with the idea,
although some people think I came up with the idea… [laughing] when all five of us
decided to write a letter, an open letter to the New York Times and the Washington Post
specifically calling for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, which was a very very unpopular
thing to do, and was very much disliked by people working in government, including
Rand, but we went ahead and did it. It was important that we were five and not one,
and that we could deal with the resulting hostility. It’s important to find like-minded
souls and then fight the good fight.
30:33

LADY J: Since you said nothing is too personal, I wanted to dig in a bit and ask about how you
mentioned the way that the friendship played a major role. I’m assuming you meant
with the five people you wrote to the New York Times with? My question is, what was it
about the way that they became friends with you that made you feel you could change?
MG:

I think so, but if not, you can steer me in the right direction. Like I said, these five are
personal, they are very warm individuals, humane in their personal conduct. Very smart.
Much more learned than I, because at that time I was pretty junior, you know. It was
very unusual that someone my age, which is to say 25, was a professional staff member
at Rand. These were much older people, but they took me under wing and I just, in a
variety of ways, learned from them as I did my research. I had tremendous respect for
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them. They were people of integrity, both personally and intellectually. I felt I was on
the right track.

CLEOPHAS CHAMBLISS: Was it the information you uncovered working at the Pentagon that
kind of helped you change your mind, finding out that they had been lying to the
American people, or is it like, you know, a “War is bad!” kind of moment?

MG:

I think that if you were to read the Pentagon Papers—and within a few days after I left
Rand to start my teaching career, I was interviewed by the New York Times and gave my
full support to Daniel Ellsberg for having started to reveal those papers—the thing that I
said, the main message that I gave at the time and then afterward was that what was so
important about the Pentagon Papers and why it was so necessary that they be made
public was the record of deceit. Deceit of the American people, who were being told all
along that the war was being won when in fact it was being lost. When they were being
lied to about casualty figures, about bombing, about the terrible price that ordinary
people in Vietnam were paying for the war, and on and on and on. So that was very
much a factor in my thinking, and when I read those documents that were a part of my
research, all of those very same factors were very clear. The terrible price that the
Vietnamese people were paying for this war, which of course did not enter into the
calculations of those making decisions at the highest levels. And that much became very
clear as well with the Pentagon Papers. Those papers are valuable, terribly valuable, for
that reason.

PATRICIA SCHECHTER: It was a beautiful question. On the one hand, Mel, your narrative
resonates deeply with what I’ve been learning as a historian who’s parachuted into
conflict resolution: that one of the first steps to conflict resolution is to humanize and
understand who we’re in conflict with. The first part of your narrative was about
hearing the voices of the Viet Cong, correct? Seeing them as humans making choices in
constrained circumstances like we all do. But CC really raised another question, right?
Someone could be like, “But they’re people, too!” and that’s not necessarily an
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argument against war, because wars happen between people and real people. But she
really identified this other dimension of political corruption, political compromise that,
together, found a powerful alignment.
MG:

If I could just add something. One other element of that which is not often brought out,
but I think is, again, something can be read from the Pentagon Papers and also from the
material I was reading other than the papers. That is, at the highest levels of decision
making on the war, the dehumanization not only applied to the enemy, but also to our
supposed friends. In other words, the South Vietnamese who we were supposedly going
to liberate were actually viewed with disdain. They were just, in a sense, in the way.
They were corrupt, and inefficient, and they lacked the nationalist appeal of the other
side. The whole idea was how to win the war without them.

CC:

That goes back to that “white man’s burden.”

MG:

[laughing] Yeah, in a way, yes. Yes. A very racist view. They were in the way.

PS:

I want to be mindful of our time, and of course I want to give Jake the opportunity to
ask the last question or the closing question. One thing that we’ve been bumping up
against as historians in this project is this kind of cleavage in what people say, what
people do, what people read, what people study between peace and conflict. Let’s face
it: an artist, a newspaper person would say conflict is where power shows its teeth. It’s
where we see ourselves with clarity. Peace is boring. Peace has no narrative. There’s no
beginning, middle and end. It’s not a story, it’s a state. We’ve really struggled at
different levels with how to study the history of memorialization of peace and war, and
the very uncomfortable relationship between those two categories. In the middle of
your discussion, you talked about how we’re really good at diagnosing conflict and less
at the diagnostics of peace. I wondered if you wanted to say a little more about that.

MG:

Well, I can certainly speak to it so far as political sciences are concerned. I think it’s
pretty clear that in just the raw numbers, only a tiny fraction of political scientists
studying international conflict really are interested in, much less writing about, the
resolution of conflict. They can be very good at describing the origins and evolution of a
conflict, the long history of it, and they can get into great detail about it, but they stop
short of really thinking seriously about what it would take for this conflict to come to
some kind of closure. Not necessarily resolution, but there are any number of options
there for maybe managing the conflict. All of those are very important gradations of
bringing a conflict to some kind of rough ending, and they just don’t want to touch
those kinds of things.
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There’s a project I’m involved in right now which may illustrate that. I’ve been
associated for a long time with the journal Asian Perspective. I’m no longer the editorin-chief because I retired from that, but I’m working with the current editor-in-chief.
What we’re looking at right at this moment is the U.S.-China relationship which,
needless to say, is highly conflictual and getting worse. What we’re doing is insisting
that the authors of this special issue that we’re trying to put together for the journal not
merely addresses the kinds of conflicts that go into the U.S.-China relationship, but how
do we get out of this morass? What will it take? What are some of the new ideas or
things worth testing to try to deal with this? I’ll be interested to see how many of these
China specialists, who are all very good at their job in terms of talking about conflict, can
shift gears and talk about resolution. So we’ll see.
PS:

Thank you for that. Historians are always a little envious of the political scientists
because you tend to be more prognosticators. We tend to look back and you guys tend
to look a little more forward. Your perspective is interesting that maybe not as forward
as they might had peace been on the agenda.

MG:

We don’t want predictions. Those are usually wrong, and not many political scientists
are interested in getting into the prediction game. We do want ideas, and for dealing
with ongoing and very dangerous conflicts, ideas that reflect some serious multilevel
thinking about what it would take. That’s not easy, but that’s a good intellectual
challenge and, moreover, it might actually have some genuine value if decision makers
actually choose to pick up a book, in a very anti-Trumpian way, and actually read what
experts have to say. But that’s a whole other challenge.

JH:

Thank you very much for taking the time to speak with us, Mel. We appreciate it. That
concludes this interview. Thank you everyone for participating.

MG:

Thank you, Jake. Good luck with the project.

